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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

Case No. 930609-CA

:

ANTHONY LEE STERLING,

- :

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated
assault by a prisoner, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.5(1) (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was defendant unfairly prejudiced by the surprise

testimony of Officer Dana concerning defendant's admissions?
This issue has not been preserved for appeal.
Defendant never requested that the trial court exercise its
remedial powers under rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and thereby waived his claim of unfair prejudice in the
trial court.
2.

State v. Larson 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989).
Was defendant unfairly prejudiced by the alleged

conduct of Officer Dalton during closing argument?
This issue has not been preserved for appeal.
Defendant affirmatively waived any claim of prejudice based on

the officer's alleged conduct in the trial court.

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that "invited error [] is procedurally
unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially where ample
opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result.

State v.

Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) (citing State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)).
3.

Was defendant unfairly prejudiced by the alleged

improper contact of the bailiff with the deliberating jury?
I
This issue has not been preserved for appeal.
Defendant affirmatively waived any claim of prejudice based on
the alleged improper contact in the trial court.

Parsons, 781

P.2d at 1285; State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault by a
prisoner, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103.5(1) (1990) (R. 1\.
Following a two day jury trial held August 20 and 23,
1993, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 124).

2

The trial court sentenced defendant to a one to 15 year
term in the Utah State Prison and imposed $600 restitution (R.
125, 595-97).x
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 29, 1992, defendant was serving out a
sentence for aggravated assault on a police officer in the San
Juan County Jail (R. 245-46, 489). At approximately 1:00 p.m.,
that afternoon, defendant began yelling and waving to inmates in
a neighboring cell block (R. 247). Correctional Officer Butler,
gave defendant a verbal warning (R. 247). In response, defendant
became abusive, "[u]sing foul language," and denying any
misconduct (R. 247). Officer Butler ordered defendant to "rack
in" (R. 248).2

Defendant refused (R. 250). Officer Butler gave

at least two more "rack in" orders which defendant also refused
(R. 251).
Instead, defendant became increasingly agitated and
asked if he would be "written up" (R. 251, 253). When Officer
Butler informed defendant that a disciplinary report would be
filed, defendant threatened, "'You will have to rack me in'" (R.

1

The trial court did not specify whether defendant's
sentence was consecutive to, or concurrent with, any other term
he was then serving. Accordingly, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3401 (1990), the instant term is presumed to run concurrent with
any other term defendant may be serving.
2

The "rack in" order is generally given when an inmate
becomes "unruly" or "agitated." The order requires the inmate to
return to his cell (R. 248).
3

1

252, 268). Defendant then began "pacing" in the day room,3
stopping alternately to "stand, feet wide apart and stare into
{

dispatch" (R. 253, 285). Additional correctional officers were
called to help handle the potential security incident (R. 318).
Officers Bradford and Christensen responded to the
dispatch area (R. 318). Officer Bradford observed that defendant
was visibly agitated, "pacing back and forth" (R. 320) . Officer
Bradford asked defendant "what the problem was" (R. 320).
Defendant responded that he was being "hassled" by the other
officers (R. 321) . Defendant claimed the officers were trying to
"rack him in without any cause" (R. 321). Officer Bradford asked
defendant to "rack in," and defendant refused (R. 321).
Faced with defendant's consistent refusal to "rack in,"
the officers began preparing for a "forced-cell entry" (R. 322).
All prisoners were ordered to "rack in" and the officers locked
the remaining cell blocks and otherwise prepared the jail for a
security incident (R. 323).
Defendant remained agitated during the approximately 15
minutes required to secure the jail (R. 323). Specifically,
defendant "took the mop head off the mop handle and began
twirling it like Ninja-type[.] . . . It was a defiance, a
challenge to us to come in and take him out type thing" (R. 323,
328).

Defendant was again ordered to "rack in" and refused,

3

The cell blocks in the San Juan County Jail are pie
shaped and arranged in a circle, sharing a common day room area
in the center (R. 258).
4

i

threatening, "If I'm going to get a write-up, you're going to
have to come and rack me in" (R. 323) .
Following this refusal, defendant requested an attorney
(R. 324). Officer Christensen advised defendant that if he would
"comply with an order to move into the adjacent housing block, .
. . where he would be by himself," he would be allowed to make
the "legal call" (R. 324, 386). Defendant continued his hostile
activity and began barricading the main entrance to cell block E
(R. 324, 360) . Defendant then took the mop wringer, mop handle
and broom upstairs to the top tier of the cell block (R. 329).
Striking the mop handle over the railing, defendant broke the
handle into several sharp edged pieces (R. 332).
At this point, Officers Bradford and Dalton briefly
entered cell block E to remove the barricade defendant had
erected (R. 332, 422). Moments later, the five officers
constituting the "forced-cell entry team" entered cell block E
(R. 332) . Two officers approached defendant from the lower fire
door entrance and one officer approached defendant from the upper
fire door entrance to the cell block (R. 334, 389) . Officers
Dalton and Bradford re-entered through the main cell block
entrance and proceeded up the stairs toward defendant (R. 338,
422).
Officer Dalton ordered defendant to "rack in" (R. 338).
Defendant again refused, threatening that one of the officers was
"going to get hurt" (R. 334, 338). When Officers Dalton and
Bradford were approximately half way up the stairs, defendant
5

I

hurled the mop wringer at Officer Dalton (R. 338). Officer
Dalton deflected the mop wringer with his shield (R. 424).
Officer Bradford immediately began to spray capstun, a
capsicum/pepper solution used to subdue inmates, at defendant (R.
271, 424) . Defendant continued to hurl pieces of broken mop
handle at the approaching officers (R. 33 9, 3 66) . However, the
capstun immediately effected defendant, enabling Officer Dalton
to tackle and subdue him, bringing the security incident to an
end (R. 339).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
None of the issues defendant has attempted to raise on
appeal are properly before the Court.

Specifically, defendant's

claim of unfair prejudice regarding the admission of Officer
Dana's testimony is precluded by the fact that he at no time
moved the trial court for a continuance or other similar remedy
under rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Defendant's remaining contentions concerning the
propriety of Officer Dalton's conduct during closing argument and
the alleged improper contact between the bailiff and the
deliberating jury should be rejected under the doctrine of
invited error.

Defendant affirmatively represented to the trial

court that he was unconcerned with both matters and desired to
pursue a verdict on the merits.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION OF A DISCOVERY
VIOLATION IS WAIVED FOR FAILURE TO ASSERT THE
CLAIM BELOW; MOREOVER, DEFENDANT
AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS CLAIM OF UNFAIR
PREJUDICE IN THE TRIAL COURT BY NOT
REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE OR OTHER SIMILAR
RELIEF UNDER RULE 16(g), UTAH RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In point I of his brief, defendant asserts that he was
unfairly prejudiced at trial because he was not afforded adequate
time to "prepare for the testimony of [Officer] Dana and adjust
his trial strategy."

Br. of App. at 6.

Further, defendant

claims that, but for the prosecutor's alleged failure to disclose
Officer Dana's testimony, he "would likely have" sought to
exclude Officer Dana's testimony in the trial court.
at 8.

Br. of App.

Defendant has not adequately preserved this issue for

review.
A.

Proceedings Below

Defendant filed a request for discovery on May 10,
1993, requesting in part:
All relevant written or recorded statements
of the [d]efendant.and witnesses, including
copies of police reports as a result of those
statements, and copies of [d]epositions.

The names and addresses of all the witnesses
the prosecution proposes to call at the time
of trial not supplied in response to the
above requests.
(R. 26-27) (a complete copy of defendant's Request for Discovery
is attached as addendum A).

The prosecutor filed an answer to
7

i

defendant's discovery request on August 19, 1993 (R. 113) (a
complete copy of the Answer to Request For Discovery is attached
as Addendum B).

t

The answer included a copy of an investigative

report filed by Officer Dana, pursuant to a Department of
Corrections investigation of San Juan County Jail personnel, as
well as a list of the State's proposed witnesses, including
Officer Dana (R. 113-14), see addendum B ) .
On the first day of trial, August 20, 1993, defense
counsel objected to the calling of Officer Dana as a prosecution
witness (R. 295) (the pertinent transcript pages are attached as
addenda C-D).

Defense counsel complained he had not been

notified that Officer Dana would be a witness until August 18,
1993, when the prosecutor's secretary "offered to fax [the]
report" (R. 295, 378), see addenda C-D
The prosecutor informed the trial court that Officer
Dana was intended primarily as a rebuttal witness, but also would
testify concerning "some admissions made by [defendant] to him"
(R. 296) , see addendum C.
The trial court asked the prosecutor when he first
became aware of defendant's admissions to Officer Dana (R. 296),
see addendum C.

The prosecutor responded that Officer Dana had

investigated
a grievance filed by [defendant]. He came
out and talked to one of the officers,
talking to prisoners. He wrote a report, and
I guess that report has been available to me
but I haven't had it in my file, I mean, I
didn't really know it existed, except that he
had done an investigation and found that the
jail personnel -- that isn't really part of
8

{

this -- but he did an investigation for the
Department of Corrections as to whether or
not they acted appropriately. That's the
basis of the report.
(R. 296-97), see addendum C.
Defense counsel indicated that he had no objection to
Officer Dana's proposed rebuttal testimony, but objected to the
officer's proposed testimony concerning defendant's admissions
(R. 297), see addendum C.
The trial court ruled that the prosecutor was required
to "give" defendant Officer Dana's report, "to the extent that he
has them [sic].

If [the prosecutor] does not have this report

then -- until this week, then he's only required to give it to
[defendant] when he has it" (R. 297), see addendum C.

Upon

clarifying that the prosecutor had not received Officer Dana's
report until the week of trial, the court allowed Officer Dana to
testify (R. 297), see addendum C.
Following the trial court's ruling, defense counsel
indicated he would make another objection "on the record, . . .
[a]t the first opportunity after the jury's gone" (R. 297), see
addendum C.
Officer Dana then took the stand and testified
concerning his interview with defendant, which interview took
place the day after the security incident at the San Juan County
Jail (R. 298, 301). Officer Dana "advised" defendant that he was
there "to get his side of the story,11 and also advised defendant
"that he had a right not to speak with [him]" (R. 301).

9
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Defense counsel objected to Officer Dana's testifying
concerning the substance of the interview, on the ground that
Officer Dana had not given defendant "proper Miranda warnings"
(R. 301-02).

^

Without ruling on defendant's objection, the trial

court allowed the prosecutor limited, further questioning (R.
303).

Officer Dana clarified that he did not interview defendant

{

on "behalf of San Juan County or as part of the investigation of
the criminal allegations" against defendant (R. 3 03) , see
addendum C.

Rather, the officer's investigation was for the

'

purpose of determining whether defendant "would be justified in
bringing charges against the jail personnel" (R. 3 04), see
addendum C.

<

Based upon the officer's explanation concerning the
non-accusatory nature of his interview with defendant, the trial
court found that "a complete [Miranda warning] was not necessary"
(R. 307), see addendum C.

Consistent with the trial court's

ruling, Officer Dana then related defendant's admission that he
threatened to hurt the officers if they approached him (R. 310).
During the next trial recess following Officer Dana's
testimony, defense counsel renewed his objection to the officer's
testimony on the ground of "surprise:"
I just want to put on the record the [sic] -my objection to [Officer] Dana being allowed
to testify. I would allege some surprise on
that. I was not advised until Wednesday
night in a conversation with [the
prosecutor's] office that he would
potentially be a witness. They offered to
fax his report to me that evening. It was
about four o'clock, and I just said I would
10

pick them up the next morning when I was
here.
(R. 3 78), see addendum D.
The trial court again inquired when the prosecutor had
received Officer Dana's report and the prosecutor specifically
indicated that the report "was received by the county attorney's
office on August 18, 1993, . . . [t]hat's Wednesday (R. 378), see
addendum D.

The prosecutor further indicated that was also the

time he determined to make use of the report at trial (R. 378),
see addendum D.
The trial court then asked defense counsel to specify
"what prejudice [he] suffered as a result of finding out about
[the report] two days ago rather than two months ago?" (R. 379),
see addendum D.

Defense counsel alleged "surprise" regarding the

defendant's admissions testified to by Officer Dana (R. 379), see
addendum D.

The trial court again inquired what prejudice

defense counsel suffered, or "[w]hat [it was] that [defendant
was] not able to do in the last two days that [he] could have
done in the last two months if [he had] known two months earlier
about [the report]?" (R- 380), see addendum D.

Defense counsel

replied simply that "[defendant] may have taken a plea" (R. 380),
see addendum D.

Based on defense counsel's response, the trial

court overruled defendant's objection to the admission of Officer
Dana's testimony (R- 380), see addendum D.
B.

Waiver at Trial

Defendant's claim of unfair prejudice regarding the
admission of Officer Dana's testimony is precluded by the fact
11

that he at no time moved the trial court for a continuance or
other similar remedy under rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.4

In State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988),

the Utah Supreme Court considered an issue similar to that raised
here.

Like defendant, Griffiths obtained a discovery order

requiring the State to disclose all statements made by
defendant."

Id. at 882. However, certain of Griffith's

statements that were inconsistent with the testimony of his alibi
witness were not disclosed until shortly before trial.

Id.

Griffiths objected to the prosecutor's attempt to impeach his
alibi witness with the statements and, after the evidence was
admitted, moved for a mistrial, which motion the trial court
denied.

Id.
On appeal, the supreme court rejected Griffiths' claim

of unfair prejudice on the "elementary" ground that he had
neglected to request a continuance under rule 16(g), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure:
Despite being informed of defendant's
statements prior to trial and having
reasonable knowledge that such statements
might be used by the prosecution, defense
counsel did not move for a continuance, to
Rule 16(g) provides:
If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply
with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems
just under the circumstances.
12

which he would have been entitled. Thus,
under the facts of this case, we conclude
that defendant waived relief under rule 16(g)
. . . by not making timely efforts to
mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by
the prosecutor's conduct.
Id.

See also State v. Larson 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989)

(failure to request continuance held determinative of Larson's
right to claim error on appeal); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913,
919 n.6 (Utah 1987) (recognizing significance of a motion for
relief under rule 16(g)).
This Court should similarly reject defendant's
assertion of unfair prejudice.

This is not a situation similar

to that in Knight, upon which defendant purports to rely.
Br. of App. at 7-8.

See

Specifically, despite finding the

prosecution had violated its discovery obligations, the Knight
trial court denied Knight's motions for mistrial and continuance
when two witnesses gave unanticipated testimony.
919.

734 P.2d at

On appeal, the supreme court found that the trial court's

failure to grant the reguested relief
defense.

Id.

seriously impaired Knight's

If defendant, like Knight, believed he needed more

time to adequately prepare to meet Officer Dana's testimony, he
should have similarly moved for relief under rule 16(g).

His

failure to do so is dispositive of his claim of unfair prejudice
in this Court.

Id. at 919 n.6.

As for defendant's speculation that if he had earlier
known the substance of Officer Dana's testimony, he "would likely
have" sought a "suppression hearing" to exclude "the statements
made without [Miranda warnings]," Br. of App. at 8, defendant did
13

i

in fact attempt to exclude Officer Dana's testimony in the trial
court (R. 302), see Addendum C.

On appeal, defendant wholly
I

fails to articulate what he would have done differently had he
known earlier the substance of Officer Dana's testimony.
App. at 8.

Br. of

He points to no additional facts and no additional
i

legal authority that, with extra preparation time, he would have
discovered and relied on below to prevail on his suppression
motion.

Indeed, defendant's speculative and unsupported

assertion of prejudice is devoid of legal authority, analysis and
citations to the record.

As such, it fails to comply with rule

24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and may be properly
i

rejected on that ground.

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344

(Utah 1984) (declining to address issue unsupported by "any legal
analysis or authority"); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah
App. 1992) (declining to consider claim unsupported by citations
to the record and legal analysis).
Finally, even assuming that additional preparation
would have allowed defendant to prevail on his motion to suppress
Officer Dana's testimony, there is no likelihood of a different
trial result.

See Knight, 734 P.2d at 921 (credible claim of

prejudice can be rebutted "by showing that despite the errors,
the outcome of trial merits confidence and there is no reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant").

As

referenced supra, in the Statement of The Facts, pp. 3-6,
defendant's unruly conduct was directly observed by the five
correctional officers who testified against him (R. 245, 247-55,
14

269-71, 284-87, 289, 293-94, 320-45, 359-361, 366-69, 387-90,
399-400, 403, 422-28, 431-32).

Further, Officers Butler (R.

268), Eldredge (R. 286), Bradford (R. 334, 338), Christensen (R.
399) and Dalton (R. 427, 432) all testified concerning
defendant's verbal threats of harm.

Finally, Officers Dalton and

Bradford testified concerning defendant's physically assaultive
conduct, hurling the mop wringer and pieces of the broken mop
handle directly at them (R. 338-39, 345, 424). In light of the
foregoing, Officer Dana's testimony was cumulative and
contributed little, if anything to the testimony of the other
officers.

Given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt

presented at trial, there can be no doubt that error, if any, was
harmless.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE
RESULTING FROM ALLEGED CONDUCT ON THE PART OF
A CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WAS AFFIRMATIVELY
WAIVED IN THE TRIAL COURT
In Point II of his brief, defendant broadly asserts
"that the presence of the law enforcement officer/'victim' with a
weapon adversely affected his right to a fair trial."
App. at 9.

Br. of

Further, defendant asserts that "[e]ven if this Court

finds there is no adequate showing of the existence of a gun, the
mere presence of the extra security seated behind [him] is enough
to garner this Court's concern."

Br. of App. at 9.

Defendant

affirmatively waived any claim of unfair prejudice resulting from
the officer's alleged conduct in the trial court.

15

A.

Proceedings Below

After the jury retired for deliberations, defense
counsel alleged certain conduct on the part of Correctional
Officer Dalton, which defendant claimed to have observed during
closing argument:
. . . Your Honor, during closing
arguments [defendant] advised me of the fact
that a law enforcement officer had come into
the courtroom with a weapon and was behind
him, apparently brandishing5 the weapon or
handling it in a nervous fashion, such as to
convey to the jury that it was impression
[sic] that [defendant] was a security risk.
He expressed some concern to me about some
prejudice that might give the jury against
him.
(R. 577), see addendum E.

Having brought the alleged incident to

the attention of the trial court, defense counsel further
indicated that defendant wished to waive any allegation of
adverse prejudice that could potentially result from the alleged
conduct:

s

Defendant subsequently denied having characterized
Officer Dalton as "brandishing" a weapon (R. 578-79) (the
pertinent transcript pages are attached as Addendum E). Rather,
defendant claimed to have described the officer as "handling" the
weapon (R. 579), see addendum E. Specifically, defendant claimed
that
[Officer] Dalton . . . kept on reaching up
and like rubbing his hip right where his
firearm was at. Victims cannot bring
firearms. And I don't have a problem with
it, like you said, the jury was paying
attention to the attorneys. I just need this
noted that, you know
(R. 579), see addendum E.
16

[Defendant] asked me to make a motion to
dismiss. I advised him that I didn't think
the court would dismiss the charges against
him on that --on the basis of that
happening, that the court might consider that
as grounds to declare a mistrial. And in
speaking with him, he has told me that he
will waive that he is aware of that but that
he's anxious to get a verdict on this today
and that he waives any prejudice or any
problems that may have been caused by reason
of that officer displaying that weapon.
(R. 577), see addendum E.
representation, stating:

Defendant affirmed defense counsel's
"I just feel it should be noted so that

it doesn't happen again and maybe prejudice somebody else's
trial" (R. 578), see addendum E.
The trial court expressly found that neither he, the
prosecutor nor defense counsel had "noticed" the officer's
alleged conduct during closing argument (R. 578), see addendum E.
Moreover, the trial court found that he had been "watching the
jury during closing arguments" and "[t]hey seemed to be paying
attention to the lawyers and not to other things" (R. 578) , see
addendum E.
The prosecutor pointed out that defendant's assertion
that the officer was carrying a gun was unsupported, to which
defendant responded:

"Okay. " Then let's just forget the idea, if

we've got to go through all the -- all the lying and bullshit. .
. . I don't want to argue.
81), see addendum E.

I'm just making a note of it (R. 580-

Based on the foregoing, the trial court

further found that
. . . it is the policy of the court that
[officers], except for the bailiff and those
in charge of a state prisoner, not have any
17
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firearms and so [Officer Dalton] may not have
had his firearm at all. So, there's no
finding that he actually had his firearm.
(R. 581), see addendum E.

Finally, the trial court found that

^

"the defendant has stated he doesn't want to ask for a mistrial"
(R. 581), see addendum E.
B.

{

Invited Error

Defendant's allegation of adverse prejudice resulting
from the alleged conduct of Officer Dalton should be rejected as
constituting invited error.

State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,

1285 (Utah 1989) ("invited error [] is procedurally unjustified
and viewed with disfavor" (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,
560-61 (Utah 1987)).

As demonstrated supra, Part A, defendant

represented to the trial court that he did not wish to claim any
adverse prejudice based on the alleged conduct of Officer Dalton
(R. 577-78), see addendum E.

For the first time on appeal,

defendant attempts to claim that he was in fact unfairly
prejudiced by the alleged incident he intentionally dismissed as
not worth arguing about below (R. 580-81), see addendum E.
Because error, if any, was invited by defendant's active waiver
of this issue below, this Court must reject defendant's challenge
to the same on appeal. As recognized in Parsons, "[t]o rule
otherwise would permit a defendant in a criminal case to "invite"
prejudicial error and implant it in the record as a form of
appellate insurance against an adverse sentence."
1285.
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781 P.2d at

POINT III
DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED ANY CLAIM OF
UNFAIR PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE ALLEGED
IMPROPER CONTACT OF THE BAILIFF WITH THE JURY
IN THE TRIAL COURT
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that
alleged improper contact between the bailiff and the deliberating
jury unfairly prejudiced his defense.

Br, of App. at 10-12.

However, when the contact was brought to defendant's attention
below, he affirmatively waived any resulting claim of prejudice.
A.

Proceedings Below

Following the presentation of evidence below, the trial
court brought to the parties' attention arguably improper contact
between the bailiff and the deliberating jury:
Now, I think we need to make a record
about something else that happened. The
bailiff was a new bailiff and he went into
the - he went into the jury room with the
jurors and showed them where the restroom was
and he stayed in there for some time. I
think he believes that he was supposed to
stay in the jury room with the jury. When we
found that he was doing that, I think it was
about five minutes after we'd excused the
jury, the clerk went in and retrieved the
bailiff so that he was outside the --he was
not in the presence of the jury during
anything except perhaps the first five
minutes of their deliberations.
(R. 581-82) (the pertinent transcript pages are attached as
addendum F ) .
Having explained the problem, the trial court inquired
if defense counsel desired "to make any issue about [the matter]"
(R. 582), see addendum F.

Defense counsel requested that the

court question the bailiff "as to whether or not he had any
19
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conversations or communications with the -- with any of the
jurors" (R. 582), see addendum F.
The trial court and defense counsel then questioned the
unsworn bailiff concerning the alleged contact:
THE COURT: Bailiff, Mr. Bailiff, did you -did the jurors ask you any questions?
THE BAILIFF: No questions were asked and I
sat in the corner.
THE COURT:

You sat in the corner?

THE BAILIFF: Yeah. I sat away from them by
the machine that's in there.
THE COURT: All right.
THE BAILIFF: (Continuing) -- They didn't ask
me any questions and I didn't speak to them.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:
deliberations?

Had they begun their

THE COURT: Had they begun the deliberations
when you were asked to leave?
THE BAILIFF: They started to talk about how
they were going to pick a foreman. It was
more on picking the foreman and what they
were going to do rather than on
deliberations.
THE COURT: So -- so they hadn't begun to
discuss the merits of the case yet? Just how
they were going to pick a foreman. Is that
right?
THE BAILIFF: They'd started talking about
the mop wringer and I told them, there it is
if you want to look at it. That's about it.
But they'd started talking about that. One
of the jurors had talked about [defendant].
I just pointed out that they -- you know, the
evidence was there, that they could -THE COURT: Well, you also brought the
evidence into the jury.
20

THE BAILIFF: Yes.
THE COURT: Was that -- was that when someone
or [sic] said something about the mop wringer
is when you brought the evidence in?
THE BAILIFF: Yeah. Pretty much. Well, when
they sat down, one of the jurors started
talking about it.
(R. 582-83), see addendum F.
Following the Bailiff's explanation of the contact, the
trial court asked defense counsel what, if anything, he desired
the court to do (R. 583), see addendum F.

Defense counsel

replied:
I guess I'm in kind of a bind, Your Honor.
[Defendant] advises me on this issue as well
it's not his desire, and I spoke with him
about this prior to you taking the bench,
about this issue as well as the gun, and he
indicated at that time as well as now that he
doesn't want to ask this court for a
mistrial. That he just wants to go ahead and
have the matter resolved today. So, I -- I
guess I'm asking -- not asking the court for
anything about that. On the other hand, I
think it's something that I'd -- in the event
of an unfavorable verdict, would feel
compelled to speak to some of the jurors
myself to see if the officer's presence there
had any effect on them.
(R. 583-84), see addendum F.
Following defense counsel's statement, the trial court
further inquired, "based on the evidence, by what you've been
told at this point, you're not asking for a mistrial, is that
right?" (R. 584), see addendum F.

Defense counsel responded

affirmatively, stating, "No, Your Honor.

And that's at my

client's instructions" (R. 584), see addendum F.

The trial court

sought confirmation of defense counsel's representation from
21

defendant who affirmatively responded, "Yes, sir[,]M to the
court's inquiry (R. 584), see addendum F.
B,

i

Invited Error

Defendant's allegation of adverse prejudice resulting
from the bailiff's alleged improper contact with the deliberating
jury constitutes yet another example of invited error.

State v.

(

Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989); State v. Dav. 815 P.2d
1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991).

As demonstrated supra, Part A,

defendant affirmatively represented to the trial court that he

<

did not wish to claim any adverse prejudice based on the
bailiff's contact with the deliberating jurors (R. 583-84), see
addendum F.

Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant claims

he was in fact unfairly prejudiced by the contact.
This Court has previously dealt with a similar issue of
improper jury contact in Day.

Like defendant, Day "consciously

declined to object at trial," to alleged improper contact between
the bailiff and a juror.

Day, 815 P.2d at 1349.

Because Day had

knowledge of the incident below and consciously declined to
object, this Court rejected Day's attempt to challenge the
alleged improper contact on appeal as constituting invited error:
if defense counsel, having knowledge of
improper contact, fails to make a timely
objection, 'relief by new trial will not be
granted, for the reason that a party will not
be allowed . . . to remain silent and
speculate upon the chances of a verdict.'
Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App. 1989)
(quoting in turn (Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 P. 188, 190
(1928)).

See also Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284-85 (similarly
22
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declining to entertain Parsons' allegation of improper
witness/juror contact because Parsons affirmatively waived any
potential prejudice resulting from alleged improper contact in
the trial court).
The Court should similarly reject defendant's
allegation of adverse prejudice under the invited error doctrine.
Defendant was made aware of the bailiff's contact with the
deliberating jury below and affirmatively decided against making
an issue of the matter there (R. 584), see addendum F.

If

defendant was truly troubled by the contact below, he should have
so argued to the trial court.

Day, 815 P.2d at 1349.

In

affirmatively representing that he was unconcerned by the contact
in the trial court, defendant consciously invited the possibility
of error into the trial court proceedings.
be rejected on that ground.

His argument should

See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,

158 (Utah 1989) ("if a party through counsel has made a conscious
decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court
into error, we will then decline to save that party from the
error), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm
defendant's second degree felony conviction for aggravated
assault by a prisoner,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c ? ? d a y of March, 1994
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

IAN DEC!
sistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, by first class mail,
postage prepaid, to WILLIAM L. SCHULTZ, attorney for appellant,
59 East Center, Moab, Utah

84532, this ^ T d a y of March, 1994.
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ADDENDUM A
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KAY 10 53
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
STATE CF UTAH

William L. Schultz, #3626
Attorney at Law
59 East Center
Moab, Utah 64532
(801) 259-5914
Attorney -for De-fendant
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plainti-f-f,

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

vs.
ANTHONY LEE STERLING,

NO

. 1^/7.2^7

De-fendant.
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
De-fendant requests
all

supply his counsel

copies o-f

material or information which is within the knowledge of the

prosecution or
requested

his

agents

information

certification

is

sent to the

have been complied
part

that Plainti-f-f

and
not to

be

Court that

sent

to

The

herein

the Court,

the requests

with or objected to, so that

of the court file to impair

hear the case.

police officers.

but

made herein

the same is not

the neutrality of the Judge to

1.
Defendant

All relevant written or recorded statements of the

and witnesses, including copies of police reports as a

result of those statements, and copies of Depositions.
2.

The criminal record of Defendant.

3.

An

itemization

including

physical evidence

seized from

the Defendant, identify

place

of seizure and the

the evidence,

time

names of the

and date

identification of

all

time and

persons actually seizing

of seizure,

location of

seizure,

witnesses thereto, and the present location of said evidence.
4.

Copies

S»

If

of

breathalyzer

results,

checklist

and

logs.

because of

any of

the seized

evidence no

destruction, copies of all documents

longer exists
prepared in the

analysis of such evidence.
6.

If the

physical evidence

has been destroyed, at

in request. No.

5 above

whose direction was it destroyed?

If not

destroyed, please specify a reasonable place prior to the hearing
where Defendant's counsel may examine and retest the same.
7.

If

the Plaintiff

Defendant's actions or
same

being offered

guilt

because of

behavior, set

for
the

intends

to

offer evidence

behavior after police confrontation,
purposes of
alleged

inferring or

abnormalities

forth what the behavior or

of
the

establishing

of said

acts

or

acts were, what is the

alleged abnormality of same, and the scientific and medical basis
on which to judge that alleged abnormality.

2

i

8.
negate the

Evidence
guilt of

known to

the

the accused, or

prosecutor that
mitigate the guilt

tends to
of the

accused.
9.

The names

and addresses of all

the witnesses the

prosecution proposes to call at the time of trial not supplied in
response to the above requests.
DATED

this _(/ _££_ day of May, 1993.

1A£

W i l l i a m L.
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ADDENDUM B
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CRAIG C. HALLS #1317

pan0JUBSxC2ISty

A t t

r.-.>

j J=3

&& i 3 83

°rney

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT

F. U. BOX ODU

CTATC f- IP"-"-'

Monticello, Utah
Phone 587-2128

84535

- u - u u,,„

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

*

Plaintiff,

*

vs.
ANTHONY STERLING,

*

Defendant(8).

ANSWER TO REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY
Criminal No. 9217-222

*

Attached are the additional documents regarding Requested for
Discovery as same appear in our files:
1.

See copies of Officer's Report of Rex Dana.

2.

Copy of Witness list that may or may not be used during

the trial of the Defendant.

DATED t h i s

/M
#^

day of

UUA0\

1993.

Craig C. #alls
San .Juan County Attorney
I personally delivered a copy to Mr. William Schultz, this
19th day of August, 1993.

Cfefcl&W

Julie
Wood
ulie Wood

f

"G 19 S3

CRAIG C. HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P . 0 . Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587-2128

srvFUTH DISTRICT C0U?,T
STATE CF UTAH

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

*
WITNESS LIST

Plaintiff,

*

vs.
ANTHONY STERLING,
Defendant(s).

*

Criminal No. 9217-222

*

The State plans to call as witnesses for the above entitled
matter the following persons:
1. WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN
2.

KELLY BRADFORD

3.

MONTE DALTON

4.

RICK ELDREDGE

5.

BILL KING

6.

MARTHA JOHNSON

7.

DELL HUNTER

8. TROY BUTLER
9.
10.

REX DANA
DR. STEVE WARREN

Respectfully submitted this 17th day of August, 1993.

5aig C. Halls
In Juan County Attorney

ADDENDUM C

1

A

Pardon?

2

Q

Did he kick anyone?

3

A

Not that I saw.

A'

Q

Thank you.
THE COURT:

5

You can step down.

Call your]

6 frext witness Kr. Halls.
7

MR. HALLS: We would call Rex Dana.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I'm going to object)

Rex Dana.

10 Ito this witness being called.

I don't know if you want to

11 pear that objection in the presence or out of the presence]
12 pf the jury.
13

THE COURT:

Well, come and tell me what it]

14 Us.
15

(Whereupon,

16

approaches the bench.)

17

MR. SCHULTZ:

counsel

for

the

defense]

I had found discovery on this)

18 land wasn't made aware of Mr. Dana, his report, until — when;
19 pas
20 lit —

Tuesday.

I guess, no, it was Wednesday that Julie)

21 palled me and offered to fax me his report at that time,
22

he'd left a message on my answering machine about one]

23

'clock, and I contacted her about three or four.

24

THE COURT:

Is he a fact witness or —

25

MR. HALLS:

Well, we didn't intend to call]
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tfS

1 him until we found out that Mr. Davis was going to testify,
2 ftnd then he indicated that he had had a conversation with|
3 Mr. Dana, or Mr. Davis, so we brought him here for rebuttal,
4 essentially.

But he has to leave.

But the other thing is]

5 pe also •• there were some admissions made by Anthony^
6 Sterling to him while he was being transported on onej
7 pccasion so —

but we have —

8

THE COURT:

Did you know about these beforel

10

MR. HALLS:

Did I know about —

11

MR. SCHULTZ:

12

THE

9 [Tuesday?

It was Wednesday.

COURT: '

These

admissions

beforel

13 Wednesday?
1,

14

MR. HALLS:

Well, it's in his report.

He)

15 ^oade a report and I'm not aware that we didn't supply that.
16 I

MR. SCHULTZ:

Julie indicated to me that --1

17 that you didn't know about it before Wednesday, or she}
18 pidn't.

I don't know how it was brought to your attention

19 {Anyway ~
20 |

MR. HALLS: He — he made an investigation ofj

21 h grievance filed by Anthony Sterling.

He came out and

22 balked to one of the officers, talking to prisoners.

He

23 wrote a report, and I guess that report has been available
24 jto me but I haven't had it in my file, I mean, I didn't
25 [really know

it

existed,

except

that

he

had

done

an
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1 investigation and found that the jail personnel —

thati

.2 ksn't really part of this — but he did an investigation fon
3 the Department of Corrections as to whether or not they]
4 jacted appropriately.
5

MR.

That's the basis of his report.
SCHULTZ:.

His

report

doesn't

have!

6 Anything at all about Mr. Davis. I suppose if he's going td
-.7 pe a rebuttal witness on Mr. Davis, then, of course, you'd
8 brobably like that in.

But if he's testifying to the easel

9 {in chief about admissions against interest, allegedly made]
10 py Mr. Sterling, then that's my objection.

I

11

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Halls, though ~

j

12

MR. HALLS: Well —

I

13

THE COURT:

In the first place, Mr. Halls,

14 they're required to give you those reports, but if he does,
15 you know, he's required to make them complete to the extent!
16 [that he has them.
17 then —

If Mr. Halls does not have this report!

until this week, then he's only required to give id

18 jto you when he has it.

And you didn't have it until this]

19 week?
20

MR. HALLS: No.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm going to allow)

22 the testimony.
23

MR. SCHULTZ:

All right.

At the firstl

24 opportunity after the jury's gone, can I make another]
25 objection on the record?
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THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. SCHULTZ: Thank you.

J

THE COURT: Mr. Dana, come forward and take the oath.

REX PANA
A WITNESS CALLED at the instance of thd
plaintiff, having first been duly sworn, was examined and
testified on his oath as follows:

J

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HALLS:
Q

State your name and occupation, please.

A

Rex Dana.

I

I'm an investigator for the Department^

pf Corrections.

I

Q

What does that mean?

A

One of the main things we do is we handle botw

knternal

and

external

investigations,

criminal

What do you do?

investigations,
investigations,

I

personnel]
fugitive^

apprehension, drug control and stuff in the prison.
Q

Were you asked to investigate an entry into a cell]

block in the San Juan County Jail?
A

I

I was asked by my supervisor to come down and del

pi independent investigation of alleged problems here in the
nail block on one of our inmates, yes.
Q

I

And what is the purpose of that investigation,
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specifically, that one?

Why would you be investigating!

that?
A
briminal

I don't know*
charge.

We

Just the fact that it was d
weren't

looking

at

^Independent charges or anything like that.

it

as any^

Just come down

land take a look and do an investigation as requested by SarJ
uuan County because of there being —

involving their]

pfficers.
Q

So

San

Juan

County

wanted

some

kind

of anl

[independent investigation to.determine whether what they had|
pone was appropriate or not?
A

That

was

my

understanding

when

—

from my|

Supervisor.
Q

And

what

did

you

do

with

regards

to your]

[investigation?
A

I came down and spoke with the officers involved,

jl took a look at the scene. It was being held at that time
k came down the next day after the incident occurred, or]
excuse me, the day" the incident had occurred, I believe id
was.

And I came in, took a few pictures, took a look at the

evidence/ spoke here again with some of the — attempted td
(speak with some of the inmates that were involved that were
tin the section.

I was told by those inmates that they had)

peen nothing so I wasn't able to talk with any of them.
Nobody wanted to speak with me about it.

I then left, went!
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1 to ~
I

I

2

Q

Let me

—

let me

3

minute.

4

every inmate that was in E block?

5'

Do you remember —

stop right
well, did —

theree

for

just

did you speak withj

A

I believe it was every inmate that was in there.

Q

And

6

I

7

speaking with a Steven Davis?

8

I

9

specifically by name, just that none of the inmates —

A

I'm

do

not

you

—

do

sure.

you

I don't

specifically

have

10 h I was directed by Sergeant Bradford.

it

remember)

in my

records]
all

He showed me all thel

11

—

took —

12

—

or in the section at the time when the incident occurred

13 and

took me to all the inmates that were involved ori

I spoke

to

each

14 anything, you know,
15 kncident.

of

these,

asking

if they would

if

there

was

speak to me

about

the

I was told that they were —

them

it varied from not|

16 knowing anything to not hearing anything to being in their]
17 pell reading when the incident took place.

Nobody wanted to|

18 (speak with me about it.
19

Q

Okay.

Did you ever have an occasion to visit withj

•20 Anthony Sterling about this event?
21

A

I

did.

I

left

this

facility

and

went

rightl

22 fetraight to the Gunnison facility where he was being housed]
23

and spoke with him there.

24

Q

And who was present?

25

A

There

was

nobody

present.

Myself

and

Inmate!
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{Sterling.
Q

And is this the —

approximately what time?

Is|

Jthe day after the incident occurred?
A

Yes, I believe it would be the day after, if I'it|

hot mistaken, if I may refer to my report here.

You know,

the incident occurred on the twenty-ninth and yes, it was on|
|the thirtyith when I spoke with Inmate Sterling.
Q

And how did you conduct your interview with him?|

)What did you tell him and what did he say to you?
A

I advised him that I was there to get his side of]

[the story and that I also advised him that he had right nod
po speak with me.

If he did not want to talk, then the

interview would be concluded and I'd go about my way.

He)

paid he would talk with me.
I discussed with him what had occurred down here, whatl
tl was told had occurred, and that I wanted to hear his side]
pf the story.

He then went on to basically say that —
MR. SCHULTZ: • Objection, Your Honor. Excuse)

|nae. May I voir dire the witness?
THE COURT: Yes.

VOIR DIRE

24

Q

I'm sorry, Mr. Dana, I'm —

I'm missing youd

25 title,
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1

A

Investigator.

2

Q

Do you go b y officer?

3

A

Investigator.

4

Q

Investigator.

5. Ispoke

D o y o u g o b y mister?

Investigator.

A t t h e time that you]

with M r . Sterling, that w a s in a custodial

setting.

6 |ls that c o r r e c t .
7

A

It w a s .

8

Q

And you were

9 lenforcement o f f i c e r .

employed

at that

time

as a n law)

Is t h a t c o r r e c t ?

10

A

I was. Yes.

11

Q

W a s part of your investigation —

d i d it have to)

12 B o w i t h t h e fact t h a t M r . S t e r l i n g w a s t h e potential subject)
13 p f c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s o r t h e t a r g e t o f c r i m i n a l
14
15

A

He was.

16

Q

You told us that you told him that

1.7 |— that he didn't have to speak with you.
18

A

Right.

19

Q

You advised him that you didn't have to speak withj

20 kiim, but that he 6aid that he would. Did you advise him as]
21 jwell that he was the subject of a criminal investigation?
22

A

No, I did not. I don't remember telling him thatj

23 ^ie was a subject of an investigation, just that —
2.4

Q

Did you advise him that anything he said to youj

25 pay be used against him in a court of law?
126
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1

A

No.

I just advised him he did not have to speak)

2 |to me about it, if he wished not to.
3

Q

So the only thing that you advised him of in that]

4 bustodial setting was the fact that if he didn't want to|
5 (talk to you, he didn't have to talk to you.
6

A

Right.

7

MR. SCHULTZ: Your Honor, I would —

and I'nj

8 boing to have to allege surprise on this, for reasons
9 mentioned at the sidebar, I'm going to move to keep thia
10 witness from testifying for failure to give proper Miranda]
11 learnings to Mr. Sterling.
12

THE COURT: Mr. Halls.

13

MR. HALLS: Can I ask the witness a couple of]

14 |5uestions?
15

THE COURT: Yes.

16
•

DIRECT EXAMINATION fresumed)

17
18
19
20
21
22

BY MR. HALLS:
Q

Mr. Dana, was the- —

you did not give him a|

^iranda warning?
A

I did not read him the Miranda.

Q

The purpose of your interview was not for — for A

you were not working in behalf of San Juan County or ad
23
24 bart of the investigation of the criminal allegations.
25

A

No, I was not.
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1

Q

Your investigation was with regard to disciplinary]

2 proceedings to find out whether or not this witness

—

3 whether he would be justified in bringing charges againsti
4 the jail personnel, whether they were overstepping their]
5 bounds as jail personnel, that kind of thing?
6

A

Exactly.

7

Q

It was done in an administrative capacityf not as]

8 —

not

as

a

law

enforcement

officer

for

criminal!

9 prosecution?
10

A

Absolutely not.

11

Q

And did Mr. Sterling understand when you talked to!

12 pim —

well, you say he —

you told him he didn't have toj

13 talk with you.
14

A

15 silent.

Yeah. I advised him that he had a right to remain]
He didn't need to speak with me if he didn't want]

16 (to.
17

Q

Is there anything —

18 tight to remain silent?
19

A

why would you say he had aj

Did you go any further than that?

No, that's as far as I went.

I just ~

I alwaysl

20 bo that when speaking with inmates if I'm not going —

is

21 k'm just doing an investigation, whether or not they ard
22 going to be charged criminally, I just let them know thati
23 phey don't have the right to talk to me —

I mean, they have]

24 the right not to talk to me if they don't want to.
25

Q

But the result of this, whatever you found fronj
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1 phis, you would not have had the authority to charge hinj
2 Kith a crime.
3

A

No# I did not —

4

Q

And

it

would not.

wasn't

your

purpose

to

do

this]

5 {investigation or to get this statement for the purpose of|
6 psing it for charging him with a crime?
7

A

No, it was not.

8

Q

And you did not make this available to the Sanl

9 [Juan County Sheriff's office as part of their charge in thisj
10 prime?
11

A

No, I did not. I made it —

it was made available!

12 jto them but my understanding was from my supervisor was thad
13. the —

the purpose of our investigation was to see if there

14 was any wrongdoing upon any —

because they're housed herd

15 under

state

state, you

know,

as

inmates,

just

do a]

16 independent investigation to see is there was any wrongdoing
17 pn the officers' part that we could see or any problems that]

lis we could foresee, not for criminal charges against the)
19 linmate or officers.
20

Q

Did you make that known to Mr. Sterling?

21

A

I don't remember if I did or not.

He asked me|

22 Uhat — as I remember, he said something along the lines of,
23 "Are you on my side or their side?"
24 anybody's

side.

I'm

just

I says, "I'm not onj

here to do an independent]

25 Investigation of the facts, not to charge anybody."
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MR. SCHULTZ: May I ask a couple more?
MR. HALLS: Yeah.

CONTINUED VOIR DIRE
BY MR. SCHULTZ:
Q

Investigator, you state that you did make a copy^

pf your investigative report available to the San JuarJ
County authorities?
A

My understanding was, yes, a copy was sent down

pere.
Q

Okay. And do you know when it was made available

to San Juan County?
A

I do not.

The secretaries would have done that.

Q

Do you know if that —

was that the plan before

krou did the interview with Mr. Sterling that it would be
made

available

to

San

Juan

County

Sheriff

authorities here?
A

No.

I believe

or

some
I

it was

—

it was

requested

[afterwards and it was sent down, a copy of it.
Q

Do you know when it was requested?

J

A

No, I do not.

I

Q

:

Was it sent down because it was requested from you]

pr was it requested from your supervisor?
A

I guess I don't understand what —

Q

Okay.

Do you know why —

j

did someone ever make aj
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1 request of you that says, "Send your report down fronj
2 jAnthony Sterling down to us in San Juan County"?
3

A

They may have called me —

4

Q

All right.

5

A

(Continuing) —

because they knew me and asked me]

6 jif I could get a copy sent down.
7

Q

Do you remember when that was done?

8

A

I do not.

9

Q

All right.

10

THE COURT:

11 (decision about this.

I've heard enough to make a]

I find that the defendant was notl

12 being interrogated in the sense that is intended under]
13 Miranda where someone is being accused. The purpose of this
14 [investigation at this point was not accusatory, not made in
15 kn attempt to secure a confession. It was just an interview
16 end that's manifested by the conditions where the —

the —

17 pie investigator specifically said, "You don't have to talkj
18 jto me.
19

If you don't want to talk to me, I'll just leave."

That's also indicative that even though he was, in the!

20 [Larger sense, in custody, he was not held and required, you
21 Icnow, he wasn't placed in this room and required to answer]
22 questions by the officers —

or by this investigator.

Hej

23 was free to terminate the interview at any time and knew)
24 jthat he was and elected to go ahead and answer questions.
25

So I find a complete Miranda warning was not required.
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I

1

MR. HALLS:

Your Honor, another aspect ofl

2 this, just for the court's —

as part of, maybe what I feel]

3 pie findings should be, he was not being held in custody fon
4 |this —

for this event.

5

THE COURT: That's right. He was — he was H

6
7

MR. HALLS:

He was in custody for anothen

8 ^harge and so he wasn't being —
9

I

THE COURT: He had not been arrested on this

10 bharge and no decision had even been made that the charge
11 would be filed. It was at a very — very preliminary stage.|
12 Bo, I'm going to —

I'm going to allow the questions withj

13 (regard to what statements he made.
14

MR. SCHULTZ: I was just going to point out,

15 land I guess I don't need to make a record on this point,
16 when you say no decision was made, the charge — were in a]
17 istate of flux, I would point out the proximity between this
18 interview and the time that the information was filed in the]
19 base.

It was filed inside a week.
THE COURT:

20

21 [filed a week later.

Well, okay, but still it was|

Go ahead, Mr. Halls.

22
DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed!

23
24 feY MR. HALLS:
25

Q

>Mr. Dana, you were about to indicate to us whati
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ADDENDUM D

1

MR. SCHULTZ:

Well, why don't we just takej

2 pirn out of order then.
3

MR. HALLS: We'll do that right after recess

4

THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. Schultz, dcj

5 Jyou want to make a record with regard to the —
6

MR. SCHULTZ:

Yes, that's correct, Yourj

7 Honor. I just want to put on the record the — my objection^
8 co Mr. Dana being allowed to testify.
9 surprise on that.

I would allege soma

I was not advised until Wednesday night

10 kn a conversation with Mr. Halls' office that he would
11 botentialjy be a witness. They offered to fax his report tc]
12 me that evening. It was about four o'clock, and I just said]
13 k would pick them up the next morning when I was here.
14

THE COURT:

Now, Mr. Halls, you represented

15 to the court that you did not receive the report until when?]
16 I

MR. HALLS:

For that purpose, Your Honor

17 phis report was received by the county attorney's office onj
18 August 18, 1993, is when it was received in my office and
19 {stamped.
20

That's Wednesday.
THE COURT:

All right.

And that's when youj

21 determined that you would be using that?
22

MR. HALLS: Yes.

23

THE COURT: All right. And Mr. Schultz, canj

24 you tell me what prejudice you suffered as a result of]
25 (finding out about that two days ago rather than two months
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1 bgo?
2

MR. SCHULTZ:

Well, Your Honor, originally}

3 when I raised the specter of prejudice, I expected that Mr*
4 Dana was going to testify a little more extensively than he)
5 ended up testifying,

I was advised by the county attorney's

6 office that he was going to give some rebuttal or say that]
7 he had interviewed my witness, Mr. Davis, and that Mr. David
8 bold him that he had heard threats and made some othed
9 statements, and we were going to allege prejudice in that]
10 [respect.
11

THE COURT:

Well, him not —

12 he testified is that Mr. Davis didn't —

the only thingl

told him he didn't

13 want —

either told him he didn't want to talk to him or he

14 pidn't

know anything.

So that

being

the case, what]

15 prejudice was there?
16 I

MR. SCHULTZ:

I understand that as regard to]

17 Mr. Davis and then,. Your Honor, I —

I guess I would allege

18 surprise then by not having seen this report that — thatJ
19 Mr. Dana was going- to testify that Mr. Sterling told hiitj
20 that when he came in that he was going to hurt them or he)
21 would hurt them when they came in.
22

THE COURT: But ~ but how was that ~ what'si

23 the prejudice there, Mr. Schultz?

What is it that you were

24 hot able to do in the last two days that you could have dond
25 p.n the lfcst two months if you'd known two months earlied
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*

1 fcbout this?
2

MR. SCHULTZ: Perhaps, Your Honor, had I been!

3 able to disclose that to my client that that is, we may have
4 been able to get a more advantageous plea bargain.

He may]

5 pave taken a plea.
6

THE COURT:

So it's just that he may have)

7 taken a plea if you'd known that?
8

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT: All right. That — the objection!

10 to the admission of that evidence is overruled.

I guess]

11 we've got two minutes until the jury will be back.
12

MR. SCHULTZ:

Mr., Your Honor, Mr. Sterling!

13 indicates to me that he needs to use the restroom, and l|
14 kmagine with all the apparatus he may be a little late so.
15

THE COURT: All right. Well, the clerk will|

16 pall me when everybody's back.

Court's in recess.

17

(Whereupon, the Court takes a short recess.)

18

THE BAILIFF:

19 lis now in session.
20

Rise.

Seventh District Court!

Please be seated.

THE COURT: The record will show that members!

21 pf the jury are present. That defendant and his counsel are)
22 present.
23

Counsel for the state is present.
MR. HALLS:

Mr. Halls.

Dr. Warren is still seeing ai

24 patient and so rather than wait for him, we would like to]
25 proceed with Bill Christensen.
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ADDENDUM E

1 opportunity to talk about a couple of things.

I guess thej

2 (first-thing I'd like to ask on behalf of Mr. Sterling is fori
3 Lhatevter reasons the Sheriff's office has determined to keed
4 kiim shackled during this stage of the proceedings, and wd
5 would .'like the court's permission to allow him to remain
6 seated, such that his shackles won't be displayed to thej
7 hoty! '•'
I

«

I

*

8

THE COURT:

9

'

That's fine.

MR. SCHULTZ:

Other than that, Your Honor,

10 puriiig closing arguments Mr. Sterling advised me of the factl
11 that-a law enforcement officer had come into the courtroom
I
I

••
*

I
I

12 with a. weapon and was behind him, apparently brandishing the

<*

I

*

1

13 weapon. or handling it in a nervous fashion, such as td
14 convey to the jury that it was impression that Mr. Sterling
15 was a 'security risk. He expressed some concern to me about]
16 pome prejudice that might give the jury against him.
17

I

•

I

He asked me to make a motion to dismiss.
• •

•
r

I

I advised hiiri

• "

18 [that I didn't think the court would dismiss the charges
19 against him on that — on the basis of that happening, that]
20 (the aourt might consider that as grounds to declare

d

21 mistrial. And in speaking with him, he has told me that he)
.{
22 will taive that he is aware ctf that but that he's anxious to)
23 bet a verdict on this today and that he waives any prejudice

#,r

I

*

24 pr any'.problems that may have been caused by reason of that]
25 ^fficer. displaying that weapon. Is that correct, Anthony?
::.

- <
—

i

t

,

fj

!v,.
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1

MR. STERLING: I just feel it should be noted

2 bo that it doesn't happen again and maybe prejudice somebody]
3 pise's trial.
4

THE COURT:

Okay.

I didn't notice that,

5 jiidn't notice an officer doing that.

Mr. Halls, you hafvej

6 pometh'ing you want to say about that?
7

MR. HALLS:

Well, yeah.

I guess my feeling]

8 {is if that is going to go on the record at all and may be]
9 pomething that somebody could bring up on appeal at all, wd
I

V

.

I]

10 should?;, know exactly what the defendant feels like he savi
11
12
13

I

•

I

pecausje when that was brought up, I would like the record^ td
pote that neither defense counsel nor ittyself nor the offiber|

that iras sitting with me nor the bailiff nor the judge
14 potiqed any such activity.
THE COURT: That's correct. None of — riond

15
t< v

16 bf us noticed that except the defendant and — and — B
I ••
I
17 bould 'also indicate that I 'was watching the jury dutind
18 closing arguments.

They seemed to be paying attention to)

19 the lawyers and not to other ^things.
20 I

V# V

MR. HALLS:

The only other thing is I would

21 (like to know maybe what he considers to be brandishing a]
22 Weapon because

~

•«

23

THE COURT: Would you just tell us what it isl

24
25

MR. STERLING:.

I didn't tell my attolrneJ
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1 brandishing.

I said handling.

Monte Dalton was sitting

2 tight here beside that little newspaper right there, kept ori
3 [reaching up and like rubbing his hip right where his firearm
4 kas at. Victims cannot bring firearms. And I don't have aj
5 broblem with it, like you

said, the

jury was paying)

6 attention to the attorneys.

I just need this noted that,

7 {you know —
8

v

9

v». *

THE COURT: All right.

\

MR. STERLING:

(Continuing) —

I feltj

10 threatened.
11

THE COURT: All right.

12

MR. STERLING:. And if the jury —

13

•'*•'

THE

COURT:

So

you're

—

what

you're!

•

I

14 {indicating is that Mr. Dalton was sitting right behind you H
15
16

MR. STERLING:

I felt threatened by his)

17 [firearm.
18

«.

THE COURT:

(Continuing) ~

and that he was]

19 jrubbing his hip where his firearm was located.
20

MR.

STERLING:

He had his hand

21 [firearms, on the butt of his firearm.

on hid

He had a 9mm in his)

22 holster.
23 I

THE COURT:

And of course, when —

whenl

24 bfficers have firearms in the courtroom, we want them to be

25

areful that they ~

that they keep control of them.
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1

MR. STERLING:

He's a victim in this case.

2

MR. HALLS: Well, and I'm not even — I don't]

3 think-fehat there's any indication that he even had a firearm
4 pn.

I don't know that he did.

I

I don't think it's beerJ

«4

I

5 proven- that he even had a firearm or maybe it was just an|
6 (empty holster.
7

THE COURT: Yeah, it may — we're —

8

MR. STERLING:- Okay. Then let's just forget!

9 jthe idea, if we've got to go through all the —

all the|

10 [lying and the bullshit.
*f

11

MR. HALLS:

$o — but all this is going onl

12 |the record and so we have no indication that he even had a]
irearjn and the brandishing thing is maybe an overstatement.

13

14 he was'.rubbing his hip behind the defendant is about where]
15 Ke're. fet.
. .'
>.
17 tils gun.

16

18

I
•

••
*

[firearm.

19
20

MR. STERLING:' He was rubbing t h e butt-end ofl
I
His gun was unsnapped, The h o l s t e r part of his]

THE COURT: Okay.
. .

MR. STERLING!

It's actually —
He's a victim.

A victinj

21 pannot carry a gun in a courtroom.
; .;
THE COURT: Mr. Sterling, all right ~
22
23

MR. STERLING: Am I wrong?

24

THE COURT:

(Continuing) —

25 krou're not here to argue about that.

You're not —J

You're just here tcj
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p

1 |tell.us what it is you saw.
MR. SCHULTZ:

2

We're just trying to make the]

3 tecofit.
4

MR. STERLING:

5 jion't want to argue.

I'm just making a note of it.

THE COURT:

6

That's what I'm saying,

Okay, then be quiet —

then be)

•

,•

7 Jjuiet \«— be quiet.
«

MR. STERLING:

8

Yes, s i r .

%

9

THE COURT:

All right.

Well, it is the!

10

jpoliey^ of the court that they — at the present time we're
11 evaluating that officers, except for the bailiff and those
12

I

'**•

I

(in chajfcge of a state prisoner, not have any firearms and so)
13 he may.;.not have had his firearm at all. So, there's noj
14 (finding that he actually had his firearm.
15 jit's -£ it's —
•<

In any event,

the defendant has stated he doesn't want to|

16 (ask (of a mistrial.
»

17

Now, I think we need to make a record about something

**

I

18 felse that happened. The bailiff was a new bailiff and he)
19 went into the — he went into the jury room with the jurors
20 and showed them where the restroom was and he stayed in
21 there ..for some time.
I
I

•
*

'

I think he believes that he was

22 feupppsed to stay in the jury room with the jury.

When we)

23 (found .'that he was doing that, I think it was about five]
24 hinute's after we'd excused the jury, the clerk went in and
25 (retrieved the bailiff so that he was outside of the — he)
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ADDENDUM F

1 (tell.us what it is you saw.

2

MR. SCHULTZ:

We're just trying to make thej

3 (record.
MR. STERLING:
5 [don't want to argue.

That's what I'm saying.

I'm just making a note of it

THE COURT:

Okay, then be quiet —

then be|

7 [juiefc \-- be quiet.
8 |

MR. STERLING:

9 |

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
All right.

10 bolicy^ of the court that they —
I

Well, it is thel

at the present time we're

**

I

11 evaluating that officers, except for the bailiff and those
•

** *.

i

I

.**•

i

12 {in chatge of a state prisoner, not have any firearms and soj
13 he may-.;.not have had his firearm at all. So, there's no]
*'»

14 [finding that he actually had his firearm.

In any event,

• %4

15 jit's -i it's —
•<.

the defendant has stated he doesn't want to|

16 fask for a mistrial.
Now, I think we need to make a record about something)

17

18 jelse that happened.
19 went into the —

The bailiff was a new bailiff and he

he went into the jury room with the jurors

20 and showed them where the restroom was and he stayed in
21 there ..for some time.
22
23
24

•

••

*

I

*

*•

I think he believes that he was

(supposed to stay in the jury room with the jury.

I

When wd

pound 'that he was doing that, I think it was about five]

minutes after we'd excused the jury, the clerk went in and
25 (retrieved the bailiff so that he was outside of the — he
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1 was not in the presence of the jury during anything exceptJ
2 perhaps the first five minutes of their deliberations.
3

Now, do you want to make any issue about that, Mr.

4 iSchultz?
»

5
t •
V*

MR. SCHULTZ:

Yes, I do, Your Honor.

And

6 that's! something, of course, that I can follow up with the

I
* *' •
7 nurorsr irtyself in the event of an unfavorable verdict.
8

f

I

'.

But!

I

u. guess I would like the court to question the bailiff as to)
9 Lrheth&r or not he had any conversations or communications]
10 |with the — with any of the jurors or —
•

*

« : •.

11

THE COURT: Bailiff, Mr. Bailiff, did you —|

12 |did the jurors ask you any questions?
13

THE BAILIFF: * No questions were asked and t\

./.

14 |sat in- the corner.
15

THE COURT: You sat in the corner?

16

THE BAILIFF: Yeah.

I sat away from them by|

17 the machine that's in there.

.*.;£

18

V
THE COURT: All right.
J
THE BAILIFF: '(Continuing) — They didn't askj
20 \ne any questions and I didn't speak to them.
19

MR.

21

SCHULTZ:

Had

they

begun

theirl

22 Deliberations?
THE COURT: Had they begun the deliberation^

23

24 kherrypu were asked to leave?
THE BAILIFF: They started to talk about hovd

25
£

b-
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A&

T-

1 [they were going to pick a foreman.

It was more on picking

2 the foreman and what they were going to do rather than on
3 peliberations.
THE COURT:

4
5

•

i

I

So —

so they hadn't begun td

•*

I

*•

I

discuss the merits of the case yet? Just how they werd
6 poing'*to pick a foreman. Is that right?
* *

7

I

THE BAILIFF: They'd started talking aboutJ
8 (the mpp wringer and I told them, there it is if you want to)

I

*'

9 took''at it.

I

**

I

That's about it.

But they'd started talking

I

10 pbout that. One of the jurors had talked about Anthony. I]
11 nust pointed out that they —

you know# the evidence wad

12 (there, that they could —
13

THE COURT:

Well, you

also brought the]

14 |evidence into the jury.
15

THE BAILIFF: Yes.

16

-•

THE COURT: Was that ~ was that when someone!

17 br said something about the mop wringer is when you brought)
I
*
18 |the evidence in?
19
THE BAILIFF: Yeah. Pretty much. Well, wher^
20 [they §at down, one of the jurors started talking about it.
21

:

THE COURT: Well, what do you want me to do,

22 Hr. Schultz?
•••

23
24
25

MR. SCHULTZ: ^ I guess I'm in kind of a bind,
[your Honor.

Mr. Sterling advises me on this issue as well]

at's not his desire, and I spoke with him about this prion
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4

i

1 po you taking the bench, about this issue as well as the
2 gun, and he indicated at that time as well as now that he
3 poesn't want to ask this court for a mistrial. That he justi
4 pants to go ahead and have the matter resolved today.
5 k —

So,

I guess I'm asking — not asking the court for anythingl

6 jabout that. On the other hand, I thinks it's something that]
i'
7 II'd ~ in the event of an unfavorable verdict, would feel]
* >.

•

I

8 compelled to speak to some of the jurors myself to see ifl
9 (the officer's presence there had any effect on them.
« .

10

THE COURT: Well, okay.

But —

but based on]

11 the evidence, by what you've been told at this point, you'rej
12 pot asking for a mistrial, is that right?
MR. SCHULTZ: No, Your Honor. And that's at)

13
••

•

•

14 frny client's instructions.
15

THE

COURT:

Okay.

Is

that

correct,

16 ^r. Sterling?
17

MR. STERLING:

18

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

All right.

How, Mr. Bailiff,

19 ^ou'ye indicated that the jury has reached a verdict?
20

THE BAILIFF:

Yes.

I was contacted.

21

THE COURT: All right. Then would you go and

22 |sscort the jury into the courtroom.
23

THE BAILIFF:

Okay.

24

(Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m. the jury returned tcj

25 Ithe cdurtroom.)

I ii:

:
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